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Abstract 
In this paper, we study self-employment in a theoretical setting derived from urban 
efficiency wages spatial models, where leisure and effort at work are complementary. 
Our model shows that unemployment tends to concentrate far from business districts, in 
contrast to employment and self-employment. The self-employed tend to live closer to 
workplaces than do the employed, as commuting has relatively negative effects, given 
that it affects productivity and thus earnings. We use data from the American Time Use 
Survey 2003-2014 to analyze the spatial distribution of self-employment, employment, 
and unemployment across metropolitan areas in the US, focusing on the relationship 
between commuting time and the probability of employment and self-employment. Our 
results show that employment and self-employment are negatively related to 
commuting, in comparison to unemployment, while self-employment is associated with 
shorter commutes, in contrast to those of employees, giving support to the theoretical 
background. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we analyze the distribution of employment and unemployment, with a 
focus on self-employment, in a framework based on urban efficiency wages theory. 
According to the efficiency wages models, employed workers may receive a higher 
wage than that of the labor market equilibrium in order to discourage or forestall 
shirking (Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou, 1997; Zax and Kain, 1991; Kain, 
1968,Brueckner and Zenou, 2003; Gobillon, Selod and Zenou, 2007; Ross and Zenou, 
2008) with prior evidence showing that shirking is not eliminated, but only ameliorated, 
by efficiency wages (Albrecht and Vroman, 1992).However, efficiency wages focus on 
wage earners or firms, and self-employed workers have been largely overlooked 
(Campbell III, 1993; Walsh, 1999).We go a step further and include a spatial pattern to 
study the distribution of employment, self-employment, and unemployment across 
cities, in a framework based on the efficiency wage model of Ross and Zenou (2008), 
where leisure and shirking are considered to be substitutes. According to this model, 
behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work is allowed, and 
more commuting time is related to less time in leisure.1This increases the incentives to 
shirk and decreases the effort at work and ultimately the level of productivity. As a 
consequence, commuting time is related to unemployment and wages. 
Efficiency wages theories do not incorporate self-employed workers in their 
analyses, because self-employed workers are not paid a wage but receive income from 
their own business, and thus are not compensated for longer commuting times. Self-
employment earnings are determined by a production function whose elements are 
capital investment, time, and personal (managerial and technical) abilities (Blau, 1985; 
Taiwo, 2011), and productivity (i.e., effort at work) affects the production function that 
measures self-employment earnings. Within this framework, since commuting and 
effort at work are negatively related (Gimenez-Nadal, Molina and Velilla, 2016), self-
employed workers who devote comparatively more time to commuting have 
comparatively less time to devote to leisure activities and thus decrease their effort at 
work, which reduces their productivity and ultimately their earnings. Under these 
circumstances, the probability of self-employment is lower when commuting times are 
longer, as expected earnings are lower. 
                                                
1 The relationship between commuting and income has also been analyzed in Manning (2003), White (1999), and Zax 
(1991). 
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The relationship between self-employment and commuting has only rarely been 
studied (van Ommeren and van der Straaten, 2008; Gimenez-Nadal, Molina and Velilla, 
2015). Against this background, the primary goals of this paper are twofold. First, we 
develop an analytical model based on efficiency wages with a spatial pattern that 
incorporates self-employed workers. Commuting and effort at work are endogenously 
determined, leisure time is negatively related to commuting and positively to effort, and 
thus we hypothesize that workers who devote comparatively less time to leisure will not 
be as productive as they could otherwise be. We theoretically obtain that shirking and 
unemployment are characterized by residential locations far from the business districts, 
in contrast with effort at work (i.e., employment and self-employment). Furthermore, 
the efficiency wage mechanism cannot be extended to self-employment, and thus the 
self-employed tend to live nearer to urban cores than do employees. As a consequence, 
commuting time is positively related to the probability of unemployment (in contrast to 
employment and self-employment).Comparing employment and self-employment, the 
probability of self-employment is lower in comparison to the probability of employment 
in the relationship with commuting (e.g., longer commuting times reduce the probability 
of self-employment towards a higher probability of employment). 
We empirically check the predictions of the model using the American Time Use 
Survey (ATUS) for the years 2003-2014, which includes information on commuting 
time, leisure, labor force status, and other individual characteristics. We find that the 
probability of being employed or self-employed is negatively related to expected 
commuting times, which may be interpreted as that those who are employed or self-
employed tend to live closer to the business districts than do the unemployed. When we 
compare the probability of being employed and being self-employed, we find that 
longer commuting is related to a lower probability of self-employment in favor of the 
probability of being employed. The efficiency wage mechanism cannot be extended to 
self-employment, and thus the self-employed tend to live nearer to urban cores than do 
employees, in order to reduce their commutes.  
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the spatial distribution of employment 
and self-employment, developing a theoretical urban model where productivity, 
commuting, and leisure are of major importance, in an efficiency wage setting. To the 
best of our knowledge, prior research has not included self-employed workers in such 
an analysis. We use time-use data from the US to test the adequacy of our theoretical 
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model. Time-use databases have been underused in this field, although the ATUS has 
been used in the past in commuting analyses (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2015, 2016). Our 
theoretical results indicate that the self-employed and employees live nearer than the 
unemployed to the urban business districts (with the self-employed being the closest). 
Our empirical analysis points toward the validity of the model.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose the 
theoretical model. Section 3 describes our data, and Section 4 presents our empirical 
results. Section 5 sets out our main conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
The aim of this Section is to include self-employment in the Ross and Zenou (2008) 
urban efficiency wages model, based on the substitutability of leisure and shirking. To 
that end, we assume that self-employed workers are not paid a wage, but receive income 
from their own business. Blau (1985) and Taiwo (2011) develop a model where self-
employment is determined by a production function whose elements are capital 
investment, time, and personal (managerial and technical) abilities. Within this 
framework, we assume that productivity (i.e., effort at work) affects the production 
function that measures self-employment outcomes, primarily earnings. We develop a 
model for employment and self-employment decisions (i.e., being employed, self-
employed, or unemployed) in a context where certain of the main hypotheses are taken 
from urban wage-efficiency theory with urban components, and with location of 
business and residence, commuting, leisure, and effort at work having primary 
importance. In our context, the main deviation from the traditional urban efficiency 
wages model is that we cannot talk about high wages as compensation for commuting 
(and leisure loss), and to discourage shirking of self-employed workers, because self-
employment income depends directly on effort. Furthermore, there is no external 
supervision in self-employment, which also plays a major role in urban wage-efficiency 
models. 
 
2.1. Hypotheses of the model 
We consider a linear, monocentric and closed city where the Central District, CD, is 
located at one end (ݔ ൌ 0), and the city fringe, ݔ௙, at the other (ݔ ൌ 1). The city is fully 
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centralized, i.e., all jobs and places of business are located at one point, the Business 
District, BD, which is located in the CD at ݔ ൌ 0.  
There are two types of individuals in our model, workers and landlords. Landlords 
own all the available land and play no role in the development of the model. Workers 
are risk-neutral, do not have inter-temporal preferences, and can be unemployed, 
employees, or self-employed. We assume that workers can endogenously decide their 
residential location, x, such that ܤܦ ൏ ݔ ൏ ݔ௙,and their effort at work, ݁. There are 
infinite moving costs, i.e., once workers choose their residential location, it remains 
invariable over time. We consider a population of workers normalized to 1, implying 
that unemployment, employment, and self-employment levels coincide with the 
respective rates. 
It must be noted that an opposite scenario can be posed, where the BD is located in 
the city fringe (a completely decentralized city). However, as explained in Ross and 
Zenou (2008), the key point is not the location of the BD, but the distance between 
residential locations and the BD. All these assumptions are general in urban models 
(Fujita, 1989; Ross and Zenou, 2008). Although new models have generalized the 
concept of the monocentric city to multi-centric employment, the main results arising 
from the monocentric model are invariable to the type of city modeled (Ross and Zenou, 
2008). 
 
2.2. Indirect utilities of workers 
The process behind the transitions between the three conditions of worker, employed, 
self-employed, or unemployed, is governed by a Markovian time process. We assume a 
rate ߠ ൐ 0 of abandoning unemployment. Then, individuals go to a fictitious 
intermediate state that immediately leave to become self-employed, with a probability 
݌ଵ ൐ 0, or finding an employer, with probability ݌ଶ ൐ 0, such that ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶ ൌ 1. The 
self-employed decide to give up their business and become unemployed at a rate ߜଵ ൐
0, and employees are fired at a rate ߜଶ ൐ 0. We maintain that there are no direct 
transitions from self-employment to employment, and the reverse, allowing frictional 
unemployment.  
Under these hypotheses, we have that the expected time that an individual will be 
unemployed until he/she becomes employed or self-employed is 1/ߠ, and the expected 
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time workers will be self-employed or employees until they become unemployed are 
1/ߜଵ and 1/ߜଶ, respectively. Then, we can obtain the percentage of life that workers 
will be unemployedሺݑ), self-employed	ሺݏ݁), and employedሺݓ݁): 
ݑ ൌ
ଵ
ఏ
ଵ
ఏ ൅
ଵ
ఋభ ൅
ଵ
ఋమ
ൌ ߜଵߜଶߙ ,																																																							ሺ1ሻ 
ݏ݁ ൌ
ଵ
ఋభ
ଵ
ఏ ൅
ଵ
ఋభ ൅
ଵ
ఋమ
ൌ ߠߜଶߙ ,																																																							ሺ2ሻ 
ݓ݁ ൌ
ଵ
ఋమ
ଵ
ఏ ൅
ଵ
ఋభ ൅
ଵ
ఋమ
ൌ ߠߜଵߙ ,																																																							ሺ3ሻ 
with ߙ ≔ ߜଵߜଶ ൅ ߠߜଶ ൅ ߠߜଵ. 
Note that, since the population is normalized to 1, u, se and we coincide with the 
levels, and rates, of unemployment, self-employment, and employment, respectively. 
Further, it must be that ݑ ൌ ܲሺbeing	unemployed|	ݏ. ݏ. ሻ, ݏ݁ ൌ ܲሺbeing self-employed 
|	ݏ. ݏ. ሻ, and ݓ݁ ൌ ܲሺbeing	employed|	ݏ. ݏ. ሻ with s.s. denoting the steady state. 
Now, we define, for each type of worker, the instant utility and the indirect utility 
that will allow us to develop the equilibrium. 
 
2.2.i. Indirect utility of employees 
Following Ross and Zenou (2008), we define an instant utility 
ݖ ൅ ܸሺ݈, ݁ሻ      (4) 
where z is the consumption of goods (at unitary prices), and ܸሺ݈, ݁ሻ is the instant utility 
from leisure and effort at work, l and ݁, respectively.  
We assume that ݈ ൌ ݈ሺݔሻ, i.e., the availability of leisure depends on the commute 
from home to work or, in our setting, on the residential location. For instance, ݈ᇱሺݔሻ ൏ 0 
and the more commuting, the less time available for leisure (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 
2016). Further, we maintain that effort at work and leisure are not independent 
activities: the extent to which individuals benefit from shirking, and not putting effort 
into work, arises from the availability of leisure time (Ross and Zenou, 2008). 
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ܸሺ݈, ݁ሻ has the following properties: it increases with leisure and, consequently, 
decreases with commuting), డ௏ሺ௟,௘ሻడ௟ ൐ 0, and it decreases with effort at work, 
డ௏ሺ௟,௘ሻ
డ௘ ൏
0.In both cases, there are decreasing returns to scale, డమ௏ሺ௟,௘ሻడ௟మ ൏ 0 and 
డమ௏ሺ௟,௘ሻ
డ௘మ ൏ 0. These 
hypotheses are the same as in Ross and Zenou (2008). However, a key theoretical and 
empirical ambiguity emerges in that work, since it is unknown whether leisure and 
effort are complementary or substitutes, and it is also unknown whetherడ
మ௏ሺ௟,௘ሻ
డ௟డ௘ is 
positive or negative. Despite that their results point to the first option, no empirical test 
is done. Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2016) empirically test that hypothesis, giving robustness 
to the Ross and Zenou (2008) results and directly finding a negative association 
between leisure and shirking, defined as the opposite to effort at work, െ݁. Then, we 
maintain that డ
మ௏ሺ௟,௘ሻ
డ௟డ௘ ൐ 0, and less time devoted to leisure (i.e., less time for rest and 
relaxation) has as a consequence an increase in the benefits derived from leisure at work 
(i.e., from shirking). 
We assume fixed and exogenous wages,ݓ, and working times, ܶ. When we 
normalize the total available time to 1, we have the following budgetary and time 
constraints: 
ݓܶ ൌ ݖ ൅ ܴሺݔሻ ൅ ߬ݔ,																																																											ሺ5ሻ 
1 െ ܶ ൌ ݈ ൅ ݐݔ,																																																																ሺ6ሻ 
where R(x) represents the living costs in ݔ, and ߬ and t represent the relationship 
between commuting costs and distance, and commuting time and distance, respectively. 
With these, we can now define the indirect utility, in terms of the endogenous variables 
e and ݔ, of the employed workers: 
ܫ௪௘ ൌ ܫ௪௘ሺݔ, ݁ሻ ൌ ݓܶ ൅ ܸሺ1 െ ܶ െ ݐݔ, ݁ሻ െ ܴሺݔሻ െ ߬ݔ,																											ሺ7ሻ 
which measures income, plus utility from leisure and effort, minus living costs and 
commuting costs. 
 
2.2.ii. Indirect utility of the unemployed 
The instant utility of the unemployed also depends on the unitary consumption of 
goods, although it cannot depend on leisure and effort at work because, on the one hand, 
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unemployed workers cannot make effort at work, and, on the other, the unemployed do 
not work, nor do they commute, and thus݈ ൌ 1. We can assume that their instant utility 
can be expressed as a constant 
ݖ଴ ൅ ଴ܸ,																																																																								ሺ8ሻ 
with ݖ଴ ൏ ݖ (Ross and Zenou, 2008). Because ݈ ൌ 1, the unemployed do not have a 
temporal constraint, but only a budgetary one. If we assume that the unemployed 
receive a benefit b from unemployment, normalized to 0, we can write: 
0 ൌ ݖ଴ ൅ ܴሺݔሻ.																																																																		ሺ9ሻ 
Oppositely to Ross and Zenou (2008), we drop commuting costs from the 
unemployed. Those authors argue that the commuting of the unemployed is represented 
by the daily costs of searching for a job and going to interviews, but we consider that 
this assumption is too strong, because the search for work, and even job interviews, are 
mainly done on the internet, and thus entails no commuting cost.2 The instant utility of 
the unemployed workers results as the fixed utility from leisure, minus the living costs, 
and can be written as follows: 
ܫ௨ ൌ ܫ௨ሺݔሻ ൌ ଴ܸ െ ܴሺݔሻ.																																																		ሺ10ሻ 
 
2.2.iii. Indirect utility of the self-employed 
The self-employed receive no wage from an employer, but income from an individual 
production function. Then, there is no theoretical background supporting the existence 
of efficiency wages, or any similar mechanism, for these workers. Despite that, the main 
idea of substitutability between leisure and shirking (or complementarity between 
leisure and effort at work) is invariable to the type of work. Hence, we maintain that the 
self-employed can be added to the model. Their instant utility is the same as that for 
employees, and is given by Equation (4), and their time constraint is given by Equation 
(6). 
We assume that self-employed income is given by a production function ܨ ൌ
ܨሺܶ, ݇, ݁ሻ, where T is the time input, k the capital input, and e the personal input, i.e., 
the personal effort at work (Blau, 1985; Taiwo, 2011; Molina, Velilla and Ortega, 
                                                
2 The exclusion of the unemployed commuting costs does not suppose any qualitative change in the model. Results 
do not significantly vary. 
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2016). In the current setting, we assume that T is fixed (as for the employees), and k is 
exogenous. Thus, ܨ ൌ ܨሺ݁ሻ, and self-employmentoutcomes directly depend on personal 
effort at work. We assume that ܨᇱሺ݁ሻ ൐ 0 and ܨᇱᇱሺ݁ሻ ൏ 0. The budgetary constraint is 
then: 
ܨሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݖ ൅ ܴሺݔሻ ൅ ߬ݔ,																																																					ሺ11ሻ 
and we can write the indirect utility of the self-employed as follows: 
ܫ௪௘ ൌ ܫ௪௘ሺݔ, ݁ሻ ൌ ܨሺ݁ሻ ൅ ܸሺ1 െ ܶ െ ݐݔ, ݁ሻ െ ܴሺݔሻ െ ߬ݔ.																							ሺ12ሻ 
 
2.2.iv. Life-cycle utility 
By weighting each indirect utility by the corresponding probability, in the steady state, 
of being employed, self-employed, or unemployed, we can obtain the expected life-
cycle utility of workers, as a function of e and ݔ: 
ܫ ൌ ܫሺݔ, ݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺ	ݑ	|	ݏ. ݏ. ሻ	ܫ௨ ൅ ሺ	ݓ݁	|	ݏ. ݏ. ሻ	ܫ௪௘ ൅ ሺ	ݏ݁	|	ݏ. ݏ. ሻ	ܫ௦௘ ൌ 
ൌ ߠߜଵߙ ݓܶ ൅
ߠߜଶ
ߙ ܨሺ݁ሻ ൅
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶሻ
ߙ ܸሺ1 െ ܶ െ ݐݔ, ݁ሻ ൅
ߜଵߜଶ
ߙ ܫ௨ െ
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶሻ
ߙ ߬ݔ െ ܴሺݔሻ.					ሺ13ሻ 
 
2.3. Equilibrium 
2.3.i. Two levels of effort and efficiency wages theory 
We define the equilibrium of the model as the point where all workers have the same 
expected life-cycle utility, in terms of their effort at work and their residential location. 
To that end, we propose two levels of effort, in terms of the idiosyncrasy of workers 
regarding their level of effort: effort at work,݁ଵ, and shirking at work,݁଴, with݁ଵ ൐ ݁଴ 
(Ross and Zenou, 2008). 
Here, efficiency wages theory plays a major role, since shirking behavior implies, 
against an efficiency wage background where firms pay higher wages to discourage 
shirking, an increase in the probability of being fired. We can consider a process where 
workers are monitored by firms. Then, if a worker is caught shirking, which can occur 
with a probability ݉ ൐ 0, he/she will be automatically fired. While this has no effect on 
the Markovian process for the non-shirkers, and then Equations (1), (2) and (3) remain 
unchanged (i.e., ݑଵ ൌ ݑ, ݓ݁ଵ ൌ ݓ݁ and ݏ݁ଵ ൌ ݏ݁), the transition rates of the shirker 
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workers are affected by the monitoring process. Now, employees are fired with a 
probability ߜଶ ൅ ݉ ൐ ߜଶ ൐ 0, and thus the expected time that a worker is employed 
until he/she is fired is ଵఋమା௠ ൏
ଵ
ఋమ.  
For the case of the self-employed, there is no mechanism of monitoring because 
they do not have an employer. However, here F plays a major role. Shirker workers will 
have lower income than the non-shirkers, ܨሺ݁ଵሻ ൐ ܨሺ݁଴ሻ, since ܨᇱ ൐ 0. Then, we can 
suppose that the productive self-employed will have a greater probability of not giving 
up their business, in contrast to shirkers. This can be due not only to income, but also to 
other individual characteristics, such as the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, optimism, or the 
family and financial environment (Cueto et al., 2015; Dawson et al., 2015; Molina et al., 
2016). We assume the same change in the probability of giving up a business as for the 
employees, ߜଵ ൅ ݉ ൐ ߜଵ ൐ 0, so the expected time that a worker will be self-employed 
until he/she leaves is ଵఋభା௠ ൏
ଵ
ఋభ. Hence, the differentiation between the two types of 
workers has two different implications for the self-employed, directly, regarding their 
income, and indirectly, the rate of giving-up. 
We now calculate the rate of shirker workers being unemployed, employed, and 
self-employed: 
ݑ଴ ൌ
ଵ
ఏ
ଵ
ఏ ൅
ଵ
ఋభା௠ ൅
ଵ
ఋమା௠
ൌ ሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ,																													ሺ14ሻ 
ݓ݁଴ ൌ
ଵ
ఋమା௠
ଵ
ఏ ൅
ଵ
ఋభା௠ ൅
ଵ
ఋమା௠
ൌ ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ,																															ሺ15ሻ 
ݏ݁଴ ൌ
ଵ
ఋభା௠
ଵ
ఏ ൅
ଵ
ఋభା௠ ൅
ଵ
ఋమା௠
ൌ ߠሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ,																																ሺ16ሻ 
withߚ ൌ ሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻ ൅ ߠሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻ ൅ ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻ ൐ ߙ, since ݉ ൐ 0.When we 
compare these with the corresponding rates of the non-shirkers, we find that: 
Proposition 1. Non-shirker workers tend to spend less time unemployed during their 
life-cycle. 
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Dem: We must check if ݑ଴ ൐ ݑଵ. Since all arguments are positive: ݑ଴ ൐ ݑଵ ⟺
ሺఋమା௠ሻሺఋభା௠ሻ
ሺఋభା௠ሻሺఋమା௠ሻାఏሺఋమା௠ሻାఏሺఋభା௠ሻ ൐
ఋమఋభ
ఋభఋమାఏఋమାఏఋభ ⟺
ఏ
ఋమା௠ ൅
ఏ
ఋభା௠ ൏
ఏ
ఋభ ൅
ఏ
ఋమ,which is 
trivial. 
As a consequence of Proposition 1, we obtain that non-shirker workers spend more 
time, during their expected life-cycle, employed and self-employed than their shirker 
counterparts. Since the variations of we and se from non-shirkers to shirkers are 
analogous, ݓ݁଴ ൏ ݓ݁ଵ ⟺ ݏ݁଴ ൏ ݏ݁ଵ, and whileݑ ൅ ݓ݁ ൅ ݏ݁ ൌ 1in both cases, the 
result follows. That is to say, among non-shirkers, employees and the self-employed 
will predominate in comparison with non-shirkers, where the rate of unemployment will 
be higher than among the non-shirkers. 
 
2.3.ii. Workers’ location within the city 
In the steady state, all workers, non-shirkers and shirkers, will have the same life-cycle 
utility,ܫ௘௤, as a function of the remaining endogenous variable, the residential location x. 
While for the former group the life-cycle utility, ܫଵ, is given by Equation (13) evaluated 
in ݁ଵ, the different transition rates of the shirkers change their life-cycle utility to 
ܫଶ ൌ ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ݓܶ ൅
ߠሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻ
ߚ ܨሺ݁଴ሻ ൅
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶ ൅ 2݉ሻ
ߚ ܸሺ1 െ ܶ െ ݐݔ, ݁଴ሻ ൅ 
൅ሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ܫ௨ െ
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶ ൅ 2݉ሻ
ߚ ߬ݔ െ ܴሺݔሻ.																					ሺ17ሻ 
We now obtain an expression of the bid rent functions of workers, in terms of x and 
I. Bid rents represent workers’ demand for land, i.e., the amount that they are willing to 
pay, in the equilibrium, for a unit of land in x. When we clear ܴሺݔሻ in equations (13) 
and (17), we obtain an expression of the bid rents of non-shirker and shirker workers, 
respectively: 
߰ଵ൫ݔ, ܫ௘௤൯ ൌ ߠߜଵߙ ݓܶ ൅
ߠߜଶ
ߙ ܨሺ݁ଵሻ ൅
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶሻ
ߙ ܸሺ1 െ ܶ െ ݐݔ, ݁ଵሻ ൅ 
൅ߜଵߜଶߙ ܫ௨ െ
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶሻ
ߙ ߬ݔ െ ܫ௘௤,																																						18ሻ 
߰଴൫ݔ, ܫ௘௤൯ ൌ ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ݓܶ ൅
ߠሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻ
ߚ ܨሺ݁଴ሻ ൅
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶ ൅ 2݉ሻ
ߚ ܸሺ1 െ ܶ െ ݐݔ, ݁଴ሻ ൅ 
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൅ሺߜଵ ൅ ݉ሻሺߜଶ ൅ ݉ሻߚ ܫ௨ െ
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶ ൅ 2݉ሻ
ߚ ߬ݔ െ ܫ௘௤.																							19ሻ 
Note that డటభడ௫ 	and	
డటమ
డ௫  are always negative: 
డట೔
డ௫ ൌ ܣ௜
డ௏
డ௟
డ௟
డ௫ െ ܣ௜߬, andܣ௜ ൐ 0,݅ ൌ
1, 2,డ௏డ௟ ൐ 0, 
డ௟
డ௫ ൏ 0, ߬ ൐ 0. That is to say, both groups prefer to live as near as possible 
to the BD, since the closer the location is to the BD, the more workers are willing to pay 
for it.  However, the group with the greater demand for land nearer the BD will live 
there, since they are willing to pay more for the land than the other group, which will be 
relegated to the outskirts. Further, there must be a point, ݔ෤, that separates the areas 
where both groups choose to locate their residences. Then, the group with the steepest 
slope bid rent will choose to reside in the city (BD ൏ ݔ ൏ ݔ෤), and the group with the 
lesser slope will reside in the outskirts (ݔ෤ ൏ ݔ ൏ ݔ௙). 
 
Proposition 2. Non-shirkers and the productive self-employed will live in the city. 
Dem: Since డటభడ௫ ,
డటమ
డ௫ ൏ 0, we need to see whether 
డటభ
డ௫ ൏
డటమ
డ௫  or, equivalently, െ
డటభ
డ௫ ൐
െ డటమడ௫ .   
െ߲߰ଵ߲ݔ ൌ െ
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶሻ
ߙ
߲ܸሺ݈, ݁ଵሻ
߲݈
߲݈ሺݔሻ
߲ݔ ൅
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶሻ
ߙ ߬, 
െ߲߰ଶ߲ݔ ൌ െ
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶ ൅ 2݉ሻ
ߚ
߲ܸሺ݈, ݁଴ሻ
߲݈
߲݈ሺݔሻ
߲ݔ ൅
ߠሺߜଵ ൅ ߜଶ ൅ 2݉ሻ
ߚ ߬. 
When we assume thatడ௏ሺ௟,௘భሻడ௟ ൎ
డ௏ሺ௟,௘బሻ
డ௟ , i.e., the variation of V when l varies is similar 
for non-shirkers and shirkers, then the result follows, since డ௟ሺ௫ሻడ௫ ൏ 0, and 
ఏሺఋభାఋమሻ
ఈ ൌ
1 െ ݑଵ, ఏሺఋభାఋమାଶ௠ሻఉ ൌ 1 െ ݑ଴, and 1 െ ݑଵ ൐ 1 െ ݑ଴ ⟺ ݑଵ ൏ ݑ଴, which is Proposition 
1. 
Note that this result indicates that individuals who idiosyncratically are prone to 
shirk will reside in the outskirts, and individuals who make effort at work will live near 
the BD. Under the same conditions of agreed working hours, non-shirkers will devote 
less time to commuting and will have more time for leisure. Then, even when they 
personally tend not to shirk, their endogenously-chosen residential locations encourage 
effort at work, under the key assumption of substitution between leisure and shirking, 
12 
 
empirically demonstrated in Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2016). On the other hand, the 
residential location of shirkers additionally promotes shirking, since they have longer 
commutes and thus less leisure time. These patterns promote the formation of clusters in 
urban areas, with productive workers living in the surroundings of business districts. 
This would mean that, if firms can detect shirking and observe workers’ residential 
location, centralized cities would concentrate the employed population near the city 
center, while decentralized and polycentric ones would concentrate the employed 
population in the outskirts, or in the surroundings of the corresponding employment 
cores, favoring the polarization of urban areas.  
 
2.3.iii. Relationships between income, effort, and shirking: Self-employed versus 
employees’ residential location 
The existing literature suggests that the self-employed belong to a different labor-search 
market than employees, since they in fact look for places where they can establish a 
business, rather than for job vacancies, leading them to less-imperfect information and 
shorter commutes (e.g., Zax, 1991; Holzer, 1994; Stutzer and Frey, 2008). 
We try to find differences in a scenario where such variations are not considered, 
and the only difference is that income is exogenous for the employees, but endogenous 
for the self-employed. We limit our analysis to those individuals who do not shirk, 
although it would be analogous for shirkers. 
Increases in w would discourage shirking and increase e among employees, under 
the efficiency wages theory. Then, when wages increase, the percentage of shirkers in 
the city would decrease and ݔ෤would increase: డ௫෤డ௪ ൐ 0 (Ross and Zenou, 2008). 
When we analyze the corresponding relationship among the self-employed, we 
cannot develop an analogous argument. On the one hand, if there is an increase in F due 
to a general increase of e among all workers, the causal relationship between income 
and effort at work would be opposite to that for employees: income increases because 
individuals devote, in general, more effort at work, but there is no reason to consider an 
increase of e due to increases in self-employment outcomes. 
Let us suppose that there is an increase in F that is due to an external shock, and it 
is independent of e. Then, what would be the effect one? Conceptually, it can be that: a) 
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Workers reduce their effort, keeping F and x invariable, b) Workers maintain their 
levels of effort and adjust their commuting behavior, or c) Workers increase their level 
of effort, analogous to the efficiency wage mechanism. 
Proposition 3: 0 ൏ | డிడ௫෤ | ൏
డ௪
డ௫෤  and there is no clear mechanism analogous to efficiency 
wages for the self-employed. Further, if this mechanism existed, it would be smaller 
than that for efficiency wages. 
Dem: let us suppose that F increases, what would be the effect onݔ෤? We know that 
߰ଵ൫ܫ௘௤, ݔ෤൯ ൌ ߰ଶ൫ܫ௘௤, ݔ෤൯ ⟺ ሺ1 െ ݑ௦ሻ ௦ܸ െ ሺ1 െ ݑ௡௦ሻ ௡ܸ௦
ൌ ሺݓ݁௡௦ െ ݓ݁௦ሻݓܶ ൅ ൫ݏ݁௡௦ܨሺ݁ଵሻ െ ݏ݁௦ܨሺ݁଴ሻ൯ െ ߬ݔ෤ሺݑ௦ െ ݑ௡௦ሻ
൅ ܫ௨ሺݑ௡௦ െ ݑ௦ሻ. 
When we differentiate with respect toݔ෤, assuming thatడ௏ሺ௟,௘భሻడ௟ ൎ
డ௏ሺ௟,௘బሻ
డ௟  and 
డிሺ௘భሻ
డ௫෤ ൎ
డிሺ௘బሻ
డ௫෤ , we find that 
߲ݓ
߲ݔ෤ ൌ
ቀݐ డ௏డ௟ ൅ ߬ቁ ሺݑ௦ െ ݑ௡௦ሻ ൅
డி
డ௫෤ ሺݏ݁௦ െ ݏ݁௡௦ሻ
ܶሺݓ݁௡௦ െ ݓ݁௦ሻ ൐ 0 ⟹																					 ሺ20ሻ 
߲ܨ
߲ݔ෤ ൏
ݑ௦ െ ݑ௡௦
ݏ݁௡௦ െ ݏ݁௦ ൬ݐ
߲ܸ
߲݈ ൅ ߬൰ ൐ 0. 
Then, we find a superior bound forడிడ௫෤, indicating that, whether it would be negative or 
positive, it would be bounded by a function of the marginal variation of the associated 
utility, the commuting constants, and the relationship between unemployment and self-
employment trade-offs between shirkers and non-shirkers.  
From Equation (20), using the Reverse Triangle Inequality, it also follows that 
߲ݓ
߲ݔ ൐
߲ݓ
߲ݔ ܶሺݓ݁௡௦ െ ݓ݁௦ሻ ൌ ൬߬ ൅ ݐ
߲ܸ
߲݈ ൰ ሺݑ௦ െ ݑ௡௦ሻ ൅
߲ܨ
߲ݔ ሺݏ݁௦ െ ݏ݁௡௦ሻ ൐ 0 ⟹ 
߲ݓ
߲ݔ ൐
߲ݓ
߲ݔ ܶሺݓ݁௡௦ െ ݓ݁௦ሻ ൒ อ൬߬ ൅ ݐ
߲ܸ
߲݈ ൰ ሺݑ௦ െ ݑ௡௦ሻ െ ฬ
߲ܨ
߲ݔ ሺݏ݁௦ െ ݏ݁௡௦ሻฬอ ⟹ 
߲ݓ
߲ݔ ൐
߲ݓ
߲ݔ ܶሺݓ݁௡௦ െ ݓ݁௦ሻ ൒ െ ฬ
߲ܨ
߲ݔ ሺݏ݁௦ െ ݏ݁௡௦ሻฬ ൌ ሺݏ݁௡௦ െ ݏ݁௦ሻ ฬ
߲ܨ
߲ݔฬ. 
Since the variation of self-employment and employment from shirkers to non-shirkers is 
given by an analogous mechanism, we can assume ௦௘೙ೞି௦௘ೞ௪௘೙ೞି௪௘ೞ ൎ 1. It follows that 
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߲ݓ
߲ݔ ൐ ฬ
߲ܨ
߲ݔฬ. 
The latter result is of special interest, since it indicates that employees have greater 
incentives to live far from the BD, since commuting is directly related to wages more 
strongly than to self-employment outcomes. For instance, it is theoretically ambiguous 
whether self-employment outcomes are positive or negatively related to commuting. 
 
Corollary 1: the self-employed would live nearer the BD than their employed 
counterparts. 
Dem: the proof of this Corollary is immediate, given Proposition 3. Employees have 
greater incentives to live far from the BD, since this gives them a higher marginal 
increase of wages than the corresponding marginal effect of self-employment outcomes, 
independently of whether this effect is positive or negative. 
 
3. Data and variables 
We use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the years 2003-2014 to analyze the 
relationship between employment, self-employment, unemployment, and commuting. 
The ATUS provides us with information on individual time use, collected from the 
diaries of the respondents, and the survey includes a set of ‘primary’ activities, 
including commuting. The database also covers certain personal, family, demographic, 
and labor variables. The ATUS is administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and is 
considered the official time-use survey of the United States. More information can be 
found athttp://www.bls.gov/tus/. The advantage of our data over micro-data surveys 
based on stylized questions is that diary-based estimates are more accurate (Juster and 
Stafford, 1985; Robinson, 1985; Bianchi et al., 2000; Bonke, 2005; Yee-Kan, 2008). 
We restrict our sample to those individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 who are 
not retired or students, in order to minimize the role of time-allocation decisions that 
have a strong inter-temporal component over the life cycle, such as education or 
retirement (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla, 2012). Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of employment, self-employment, and unemployment rates in the US, 
using ATUS, and we observe that both employment and self-employment decreased 
until 2010, but increased afterwards, while unemployment grew over the period, with a 
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clear increase during 2009-2011 – due to the economic crisis – and a decrease 
afterwards, consistent with the US Bureau of Labor Statistics data (BLS, 2016). 
To test the model, we additionally restrict the sample to individuals who are 
unemployed, on the one hand, and to employed or self-employed in the private sector 
during working days(e.g., days where individuals spend more than 60 minutes 
working), on the other. This allows us to avoid computing zero minutes of commuting 
to any employed or self-employed worker who filled out the time-use diary on a non-
working day, which would affect our computation of expected commuting. These 
restrictions leave us with 41,329 individuals, of whom 31,343 are private sector 
employees, 5,290 are self-employed, and 4,696 are unemployed. For the restriction to 
working days, we define the variable market work time as the time devoted to the sum 
of work, main job not at home, work-related activities not at home, and waiting work 
related activities not at home. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average commuting 
time in minutes per day for the employed and self-employed workers in our sample, and 
we note that trends are constant for the former, but have increased for the latter, 
consistent with the predictions of our model: longer commuting is negatively related to 
employment and self-employment, and positively related to unemployment rates. 
Additionally, the reported increase in commuting time is in line with Kirby and LeSage 
(2009) and Gimenez-Nadal and Molina (2014).We define commuting time as the time 
of commuting to/from work, coded with the activity code “180501” in the ATUS.3 
Table 1 shows a descriptive analysis of the variables, by group (self-employed vs. 
employees vs. unemployed).We show the average and standard deviations of the 
original commuting of the employed and the self-employed, and the average and 
standard deviation of the expected (e.g., predicted) commuting predicted from the 
commuting models. We observe that the self-employed devote, on average, 29.2minutes 
to daily commuting, and their coefficient of variance is 1.5, considering reported 
commuting times, in contrast with 39.0 minutes and 1.05 for employees, respectively. 
Figure 3 shows k-densities of commuting time for employees and the self-employed. 
We can see how zero and low commuting times concentrate the mass. In the case of 
expected commuting, because these are expected values, standard deviations and 
                                                
3We have repeated the analysis with a generalized definition of commuting times(Commuting timebis),defined as 
commuting time, pluswork-related travel (180502), travel related to income-generating activity (180503), and travel 
related to work (180599). Results using this alternative definition of commuting time are shown in Appendix B, and 
are robust to our main results 
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variance coefficients decrease considerably, but we still observe that the average 
expected commuting time is shorter for the self-employed in comparison with 
employees and the unemployed, in all cases. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical model, where we establish a negative relationship between commuting time 
and self-employment (vs. employment). 
We have defined other variables that may affect employment status, such as gender 
(being male), potential years in labor market (age minus number of education years and 
minus a fixed value, taken as 3), education level, living in couple, partner’s labor-force 
status (a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the partner works), number of 
children, being white, and being American, Asian, or Pacific Islander. For education, 
we consider three levels: basic education (less than high school diploma), secondary 
education (high school diploma), and university education (more than high school 
diploma). We have also included the years in the labor market squared to measure non-
linear effects. 
According to Table 1, there are more male employees and self-employed than 
female (52.7% vs. 47.3%, and 63.8% vs. 36.2%, respectively) and there are more 
female unemployed (56.3%, vs. 43.7% of males). The self-employed have had more 
years in the labor market than employees and the unemployed (24.6 vs. 20.5 vs. 19.4 
years on average, respectively). This relationship is consistent with Blanchflower 
(2000) and Molina et al. (2015), who find that age is positively related to the fact of 
being an entrepreneur. For education variables, we observe that 5% of the self-
employed have only basic education, 24% have secondary education, and 71% have 
University education, versus 8%, 28% and 63% of employees, and 19%, 34% and 47% 
of the unemployed, respectively. Thus, we find that a University education appears to 
be positively related to employment and, especially, to self-employment. Regarding the 
family variables, we show that 70% and 60% (46%) of the self-employed and 
employed(unemployed) live in couple, 53% and 45% (33%) have a couple who both 
work,53% and 54% (57%) of them have children, and family sizes are, on average, 3 
and 2.9 (3.1) members. Furthermore, 89% and 82% (70%) are whites, and 86% and 
82% (82%) are American. 
 
4. Econometric analysis and results 
17 
 
We first analyze the probability of being employed or self-employed in comparison to 
being unemployed, with a focus on the commuting time of individuals. The theoretical 
framework developed in Section 3 establishes in Proposition 2 that the longer the 
commute, the higher the unemployment rate, and thus we estimate the probability of 
being unemployed vs. employed/self-employed, on the commuting time of individuals. 
One important issue is that commuting time is not observed for the unemployed. To 
overcome this problem, we follow Ross and Zenou (2008), who identify commuting 
using cross-metropolitan variation. In particular, Ross and Zenou (2008) identify the 
effect of commuting time by the exclusion from the labor market equation of certain 
factors that can explain commuting time differences. With this approach, the source of 
variation for identification comes from cross-metropolitan area differences in 
commuting times (see Ross and Zenou (2008) for a discussion of this approach). 
But in comparison with Ross and Zenou (2008), who estimate commuting models for 
each statistical area included in their data, we cannot estimate specific models of 
commuting time for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) individually, as there are 
several MSA with less than 30 observations, and we must be cautious in making 
estimates for specific metropolitan areas.4Alternatively, we interact the housing stock 
variables with the region variables included in the ATUS, exploiting systematic 
differences between the structures of metro areas in different regions of the country. In 
particular, we interact the information regarding residence ownership (i.e., Owned or 
being bought by a household member, Rented for cash, Occupied without payment of 
cash rent) with the information on census region of residence (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, 
South, West), and thus the model is identified by the exclusion from the labor market 
equation of the interaction of region fixed effects with the housing stock variables. We 
estimate an OLS model on commuting time, and then predict commuting times for the 
employed, the self-employed, and the unemployed.5 
Once we have predicted (expected) commuting time, we estimate the following 
                                                
4The geographic information in the ATUS data includes identification of the MSA of residence of individuals. 
Metropolitan areas are counties or groups of counties centering on a substantial urban area. While the Census 
Bureau's terminology for metropolitan areas and the classification of specific areas changes over time, the general 
concept is consistent: a metropolitan area consists of a large population center and adjacent communities that have a 
high degree of economic and social interaction. Metropolitan areas often cross state lines. Information on the coding 
of this variable con be found athttps://www.atusdata.org/atus-action/variables/METAREA#description_section. For 
some MSAs, there are very few observations and, then, we must be cautious when making estimates for specific 
MSAs. 
5Sum stats of the housing and census region variables, and the results of the commuting model, can be found in 
Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix A, respectively. 
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Probit model: 
probitሺY୧ୱሻ ൌ α଴ ൅ ൅αଵC୧ୱ ൅ αଶX୧ୱ ൅ αଷW୧ୱ ൅ αୱ ൅ ε୧ୱሺ21ሻ 
where Yis represents a dummy variable for employment status (i.e., employed/self-
employed vs. unemployed) of a given individual “i” living in Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) area “s”, and Cis represents the(log) expected commuting time of that 
individual.	X୧ୱ includes the set of socio-demographic variables described in Section 
3,W୧ୱ represent housing attributes, αୱ represents MSA fixed effects, and ε୧ୱ represents 
random variables capturing unmeasured factors and measurement errors.This 
specification resembles that of Ross and Zenou (2008). Given that we are using 
generated regressors, we follow Pagan (1984), Murphy and Topel (1985), and Gimenez-
Nadal and Molina (2013) and bootstrap the standard errors of the regressions (500 
replications). Given our theoretical model (Proposition 2), we would expect that 
commuting time has a negative relationship to the probability of not being unemployed, 
i.e., ߚଵ ൏ 0. 
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the results of estimating Equation (21) on the 
probability of being employed/self-employed. We find that one more minute of 
commuting is significantly associated, on average, with increases in the probability of 
being unemployed of 3.9%. These results are in line with prior works of Ross and 
Zenou (2008)and Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2016) for employees vs. unemployed workers 
(i.e., higher commuting time is related to higher unemployment rates), and they also 
provide empirical support to Proposition 2. The implication of this proposition is that 
the employed and the self-employed live closer to the business centers, in comparison to 
the unemployed. 
Further, males have a higher probability of not being unemployed, while years 
working follows an inverted-U relationship with the probability of being employed. 
Education is positively related to being employed or self-employed, since the higher the 
education level, the lower the probability of being unemployed, in line with Autor and 
Handel (2013) and Cortes (2016). Americans have a lower probability of being 
employed than their Asian counterparts, while being white is strongly and positively 
related to employment. Regarding family features, it is observed that workers who live 
in couple have a higher probability of being employed. The partner’s labor status and 
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the presence of children have no significant effect, but heads of larger families have 
higher probabilities of being unemployed. 
We next analyze the probability of being self-employed in comparison to being 
employed, dropping the unemployed from the analysis. The model developed in the 
previous section establishes (Corollary 1) that, comparing employed and self-employed 
workers, the higher the commuting time the higher the probability of being employed 
(vs. self-employed).Given that this relationship is obtained in the market equilibrium, 
we do not attempt to estimate causal effects, but we are interested in an equilibrium 
relationship instead, and the estimation of a conditional correlation using an OLS model 
is sufficient to test for the relationship predicted by the model. 
We estimate a linear probability model analogous to Equation (21), where the only 
two changes are thatY୧ୱ is now the dummy variable being self-employed, that takes 
value 1 if individual ‘i’ is self-employed, and value 0 if individual ‘i’ is employed, and 
C୧ୱis now the reported commuting times of the employees and self-employed workers. 
We expect a negative relationship between reported commuting and self-employment, 
i.e., ߚଵ ൏ 0, indicating that the self-employed live nearer the urban cores than do 
employees. 
Column (2) of Table2 shows the results of estimating Equation (21), where our 
outcome of interest is the probability of being self-employed, in comparison to being 
employed. It is observed that, according to reported commutes, one additional minute of 
expected commuting is associated with a decrease of 4.2% in the probability of being 
self-employed (vs. being employed). This result indicates that there exists a negative 
relationship between (expected) commuting and the probability of being self-employed, 
in comparison with being employed, consistent with our model. The implication of this 
result is that the self-employed live closer to their respective workplaces, in comparison 
to the employed. This parameter is in line with the existing literature, consistent with 
the idea that self-employed workers devote, on average, less time to commuting than do 
employed workers (Giuliano, 1998; Stutzer and Frey, 2008; van Ommeren and van der 
Straaten, 2008; Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2015). 
We also find that males have a higher probability of being self-employed, while age 
is linear and also positively related to self-employment in the US, in line with 
Blanchflower (2000), for the OECD, and Molina et al. (2016), for Spain. Secondary 
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education does not have a significant effect, in comparison with Primary, but workers 
who have gone to University do have a higher probability of being self-employed, 
showing the effect of acquired entrepreneurial and managerial skills (Kotsova, 1997; 
Minniti, 2009; Levie and Autio, 2013). Being American, Asian, or Pacific Islander is 
not significantly associated with being either self-employed or an employee, but white 
workers have higher probabilities of being self-employed. Finally, the effect of living in 
couple, the active labor status of the partner, and the presence of children are all 
positively related to being self-employed, but the total family size appears to have no 
significant effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes urban employment and self-employment in a context derived from 
efficiency wages theory, with a spatial pattern, where leisure and effort at work are 
complementary concepts. We propose a new theoretical model that includes self-
employment, indexed by commuting and efficiency at work, and we find that, although 
the productive self-employed tend to live near their work-places, as happens with 
employees, commuting does not have a clear relationship with earnings for the self-
employed. Thus, there is no clear mechanism, similar to that for efficiency wages, for 
self-employment. Making use of the ATUS for the years 2003-2014, we present an 
employment and self-employment empirical micro-econometric model. 
Our empirical results show that employment and self-employment are negatively 
related to commuting, in comparison to unemployment. Furthermore, self-employment 
is associated with shorter commutes, in comparison to wage employment. The results 
presented in this paper give support to our theoretical model. Our results contribute to 
the literature by not only complementing urban efficiency wage models, but also 
offering a new theoretical study of self-employment in the United States with a spatial 
pattern, which has been underappreciated in this field. 
However, our analysis does have certain limitations: by using cross-sectional data, 
we cannot establish causal effects. Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity also has a 
strong impact on our empirical modeling, where non-controllable variables could 
potentially determine commuting patterns (van Ommeren and van der Straaten, 
2008).However, the relationships are obtained in the market equilibrium, and the 
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estimation of conditional correlations using OLS models is sufficient to test for the 
relationships predicted by the model. The results are consistent with the theoretical 
model. Second, and more important, we do not have data on self-employment earnings, 
and we cannot analyze their relationship with commuting times, i.e., we cannot 
empirically check Proposition 3. More research on this topic is needed. 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of employment, self-employment, and unemployment 
 
Note: the sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to private sector employees, self-employed, and 
unemployed, respectively. 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of commuting times 
 
Note: the sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to private sector employees and self-employed, 
respectively. 
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Figure 3 
K-densities of commuting times 
 
Note: the sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to private sector employees and self-employed, 
respectively. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Employed Self-employed Unemployed 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Commuting time 38.983 41.024 29.203 44.134 - - 
Expected commuting (1) 40.060 3.384 40.062 3.183 40.133 3.479 
Male 0.527 0.499 0.637 0.481 0.437 0.496 
Years in labor market 20.450 11.566 24.640 10.532 18.854 12.751 
Years in labor market sq. 55.199 51.251 71.802 52.137 51.803 53.697 
Primary education 0.082 0.275 0.054 0.226 0.194 0.395 
Secondary education 0.284 0.451 0.237 0.426 0.335 0.472 
University education 0.634 0.482 0.709 0.454 0.471 0.499 
Live in couple 0.602 0.490 0.702 0.457 0.443 0.497 
Partner’s labor force status 0.448 0.497 0.533 0.499 0.319 0.466 
Have children 0.538 0.499 0.533 0.499 0.570 0.495 
Family size 2.944 1.490 2.972 1.519 3.101 1.594 
White 0.822 0.382 0.886 0.318 0.696 0.460 
American 0.821 0.383 0.854 0.353 0.815 0.388 
Asian 0.042 0.200 0.032 0.176 0.030 0.169 
Pacific/Islander 0.002 0.043 0.002 0.050 0.003 0.056 
Tenure: owned 0.702 0.457 0.827 0.378 0.541 0.498 
Tenure: rented 0.286 0.451 0.163 0.369 0.441 0.496 
Other type of tenure 0.012 0.110 0.010 0.100 0.018 0.134 
       
Observations 31,343  5,290  4,696  
Note: the sample (ATUS 2013-2014) is restricted to private sector employees, self-employed, and unemployed individuals. 
Commuting time is measured in minutes. Years working is measured in years. Expected commuting (1) is estimated from 
Column (1) of Table A1. Expected commuting (2) is estimated from Column (2) of Table A1. 
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Table 2 
Model estimates 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Employed/self-
employedvsunemployed 
Self-employed vs paid 
employed 
Male 0.032*** 0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Years working 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Years working squared -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary education 0.088*** -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
University education 0.125*** 0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
American -0.025*** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
Asian 0.076*** 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.013) 
Pacific/Islander 0.035 0.055 
 (0.041) (0.043) 
White 0.089*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Live in couple 0.054*** 0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Partner working 0.001 0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Number of children 0.000 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Number of household members -0.017*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Expected commuting -0.039*  
 (0.020)  
Reported commuting  -0.042*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.775*** 0.047** 
 (0.069) (0.022) 
   
Housing characteristics Yes Yes 
   
Observations 41,329 36,633 
R-squared 0.058 0.069 
Note: the sample (ATUS 2013-2014) is restricted to private sector employees, 
self-employed, and unemployed individuals in Column (1), and to private sector 
employees and self-employed in Column (2). Bootstrapped errors in Column (1), 
and robust standard errors in Column (2), in parentheses. Dependent variable is 
the dummy working (employees plus self-employed) in Column (1), and the 
dummy self-employed in Column (2). Expected and reported commuting times 
are measured in minutes (expected commutes estimated in Table A1, Columns 
(1)). Years working is measured in years. * Significant at the 90% level. ** 
Significant at the 95% level. *** Significant at the 99% level. 
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Appendix A: Commuting model 
 
Table A1 
Summary statistics of housing and census region variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Employed Self-employed Unemployed 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
       
Tenure: owned 0.702 0.458 0.827 0.378 0.541 0.498 
Tenure: rented 0.286 0.452 0.163 0.369 0.441 0.497 
Other type of tenure 0.012 0.110 0.010 0.101 0.018 0.134 
Region: North East 0.184 0.387 0.170 0.376 0.176 0.381 
Region: Mid West 0.260 0.439 0.246 0.431 0.231 0.421 
Region: South 0.341 0.474 0.319 0.466 0.346 0.476 
Region: West 0.216 0.411 0.265 0.441 0.247 0.431 
       
Observations 31,343  5,290  4,696  
Note: the sample (ATUS 2013-2014) is restricted to private sector employees, self-employed, and unemployed 
individuals.  
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Table A2 
Commuting model 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES  
 Commuting Commuting bis 
Tenure: owned *   
Region: North East 22.893*** 23.220*** 
 (3.724) (3.723) 
Region: Mid West 14.170*** 14.428*** 
 (3.662) (3.659) 
Region: South 18.196*** 18.445*** 
 (3.661) (3.658) 
Region: West 18.458*** 18.777*** 
 (3.694) (3.691) 
Tenure: rented *   
Region: North East 24.178*** 24.380*** 
 (3.886) (3.885) 
Region: Mid West 13.159*** 13.143*** 
 (3.770) (3.767) 
Region: South 18.546*** 18.669*** 
 (3.745) (3.744) 
Region: West 19.127*** 19.297*** 
 (3.800) (3.798) 
Other type of tenure *   
Region: North East 9.936* 9.651 
 (5.953) (5.951) 
Region: South 8.660* 9.024* 
 (4.653) (4.702) 
Region: West 5.815 5.879 
 (8.829) (8.847) 
Constant 22.042*** 22.326*** 
 (3.617) (3.613) 
   
Observations 36,633 36,633 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 
Note the sample (ATUS 2003-2014) is restricted to private 
sector employees and self-employed. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are 
“commuting time” in Column (1) and “commuting time 
(bis)” in Column (2). Commuting times are measured in 
minutes. * Significant at the 90% level. ** Significant at 
the 95% level. *** Significant at the 99% level. 
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Appendix 2: Empirical results using the alternative definition of commuting 
 
Table B1 
Alternative econometric model estimates 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Employed/self-
employedvsunemployed 
Self-employed vs paid 
employed 
Male 0.032*** 0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Years working 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Years working squared -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary education 0.088*** 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
University education 0.125*** 0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
American -0.025*** -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
Asian 0.076*** 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.013) 
Pacific/Islander 0.035 0.054 
 (0.041) (0.043) 
White 0.089*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Live in couple 0.054*** 0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Partner working 0.001 0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Number of children 0.000 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Number of household members -0.017*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Expected commuting (bis) -0.039*  
 (0.020)  
Reported commuting (bis)  -0.041*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.777*** 0.045** 
 (0.069) (0.022) 
   
Housing characteristics Yes Yes 
   
Observations 41,329 36,633 
R-squared 0.058 0.068 
Note: the sample (ATUS 2013-2014) is restricted to private sector employees, 
self-employed, and unemployed individuals in Column (1), and to private sector 
employees and self-employed in Column (2). Bootstrapped errors in Column (1), 
and robust standard errors in Column (2), in parentheses. Dependent variable is 
the dummy working (employees plus self-employed) in Column (1), and the 
dummy self-employed in Column (2). Expected and reported commuting (bis) 
times are measured in minutes (expected commutes estimated in Table A1, 
Column (2)). Years working is measured in years. * Significant at the 90% level. 
** Significant at the 95% level. *** Significant at the 99% level. 
 
 
 
 
